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• '1 ,u. I l ,_If- I i /.\ 11 " 
!- ' , • 111-1.J: I f<E·SponUent, 
vs. 
Case No. 19054 
GP.PY '//\NCr E:l1.UNDLRS, 
oetendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Gary Vance Saunders, was charged by 
information with a violation of the following provisions of Utah 
Cude Ann. <1953), as amended: § 76-6-202, burglary; § 76-6-404, 
rheft; § 76-1-503(2), possession of a firearm by a restricted 
petson; and § 76-8-1001, status as an habitual criminal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury with the Honorable 
Jiiii:ef, S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding in the Third Judicial District 
C.ou rt in an cl for Salt Lake County, Utah on December 28-29, 1982. 
Jury 11Je<n1muus1 1• found appellant guilty of the burglary, 
.,,,,, ,,--cse."s1on of a firearm by a restricted person 
"' llE'• ember 30, 1982, before the Honorable James S. 
was convicted of habitual criminal status. 
nr·t'' '" 1·t 1-!1-icc sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years for the burglary; l to 15 
years for the theft; 1 to 15 years for possession of a firean: 
and 5 years to life for the habitual criminal status. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment of the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of April 24, 1982, appellant's brother-
in-law, Stacy Williams, went to appellant's home in South Salt 
Lake CT. 39-40). Williams and appellant then drove appellant's 
truck to the Phelps's home located in Sandy, Utah CT. 43, 68). 
Upon arrival, they knocked on the front door CT. 46). When no 
one answered, they went to the side door where appellant pried 
the door open using a screwdriver and pliers CT. 46). Both men 
were wearing gloves at the time (T. 61). After checking to make 
sure no one was in the Phelp' s home, appellant gathered together 
a television set, a microwave oven, and some firearms, while 
Williams, his accomplice, kept watch of the door CT. 47-50) · 
Appellant and Williams then carried the stolen items out to 
appellant's truck (T. 50). Appellant placed one of the firearms 
in the cab portion of the truck and then drove home (T. 50, Sll · 
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f'c>l l,-iw1nq LJ,c 11 return to appellant's home, Williams 
, rhe nolen quuds to his brother's home since appellant 
cc•Jt,1 lu 'JPt back to thee Heilfway House where he was residing 
1•·. S4l. W1LLi2>rns tl>efl called his cousin, Amos, their "fence", 
tn c>lo!.-erve the go•;ds IT. SS, 56). Amos purchased the firearms 
IT.55,56). 
The next day, Sunday afternoon, April 24th, Mrs. Phelps 
returned from her daughter's home where she had spent the night, 
and she discovered her home had been burglarized (T. 151. 
A television set, a microwave oven, some jewelry, and two 
firearms were missing (T. 18). The police were notified (T. 341. 
Mrs. Phelps stated that neither appellant nor his accomplice, 
Stacy Williams, had been given permission to enter the Phelps's 
home and take possession of any items in the house (T. 21, 22). 
Following his arrest, Williams showed Detective Duncan 
of the Salt Lake Police Department, which home he and appellant 
had burglarized (T. 65, 89). Williams also aided other officers 
in locating some of the stolen goods (T. 62, 63). The firearms 
and the television set were eventually recovered (T. 62, 63). 
None of the items stolen from the Phelps's residence were found 
aurinq a search of appellant's home, but stolen goods identified 
trum bu·y1ar1es in B0untiful and west Jordan were seized 
IP l 
t.c• '" t 1 ia!. appellant's counsel moved to sever two 
-''"'i aris111q out of separate circumstances (R. 20). 
3-
The cases were not joined CR. 38). The initial trial, for th], 
matter, was held December 1-2, 1982; however, during the course 
of that trial, a motion for a mistrial was granted CR. 119, 120:. 
The trial was rescheduled for December 28, 1982. Prior to this 
trial, on December 7th, appellant's counsel made a timely motion 
to sever appellant's burglary and theft charges from the 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge; this 
motion was denied IR. 127, 138). However, it was agreed that oo 
mention of appellant's other burglaries would be made without 
first establishing a foundation of materiality and giving the 
defense an opportunity to object IT. lll. 
At trial, it was stipulated that appellant was a 
restricted person at the time of the crime, incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison, but residing at a Halfway House under a work 
release program IT. 74). 
Following the presentation of testimony, the jury 
unanimously found appellant guilty of the burglary, theft, and 
possession of a firearm charges IT. 165, 166). Then at 
appellant's request, the jury was dismissed, and appellant was 
tried before the Honorable Judge Sawaya on the habitual crimiMl 
charge (T. 167). The State introduced three prior second degree 
felony convictions and commitments to the Utah State Prison to 
substantiate the habitual criminal charge IT. 171). 
Exhibit 7 (see Appendix A) contained a certified copy 
of a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of second degree 
-4-
1 ,1Jcni end H»lt in 1978, and a certified copy of both the 
dciri(1'1 and •_r1Ifln11t1nent order. 
;Ahibit 8 lsee Appendix Bl, in part, contained a 
2 2,.:.lf1<.•i copy of the JUdgment and commitment that showed 
at that time represented by counsel, Galen Ross, had 
plead yuilty to a second degree burglary charge in 1964. 
Exhibit 9 (see Appendix Cl included an affidavit from 
the defendant acknowledging that he voluntarily plead guilty to a 
second degree burglary charge in 1977. Galen Ross, once again 
acting as appellant's counsel, certified that he had discussed 
the irn[.,lirations of the guilty plea with his client. The certi-
fied copy of the judgment and commitment shows that appellant had 
been sentenced to the Utah State Prison, but was placed on 
probation, then after violating the terms of his probation had 
his ur iginal sentence imposed. 
Beverly Tisher, Records Officer at the Utah State 
Prison, identif 1ed appellant as Gary Vance Saunders and presented 
ider:t ical copies of the respective judgments and commitments 
which had been filed at the Utah State Prison (T. 1901. 
All of this evidence relating to appellant's prior 
rdon;· convictions was admitted over numerous objections by 
0
''Pellant 's c-ounsel (T. 173, 175, 1801. Judge Sawaya found 
jr,t ·'1" '-' t:, of the habitual criminal charge CR. 276-2771 • 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE SEVERANCE 
ISSUE FOR APPEAL, AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO SEVER THE FIREARM COUNT. 
Appellant contends that he was prejudiced when the 
trial judge denied his motion to sever the possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person charge from the burglary and theft 
charges brought against him. However, this issue was not raised 
during the trial, and this Court has held consistently that it i: 
precluded from considering issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. State y, Sparks, Utah, 672 P. 2d 92, 94 (1983); 
State y, Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d, 174, 176, 406 P.2d 912 
(1965). 
A review of the record reveals that appellant's 
made a pr el imina ry motion before Judge Peter F. Leary requesting 
severance, which was subsequently denied (T. 138). At trial, 
before Judge James Sawaya, appellant failed to preserve this 
issue for appeal. Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals has 
addressed this issue specifically. 
The law is well settled that in order to 
preserve a question for review in this Court, 
it must be raised in the lower court and an 
exception taken to the ruling, preserved in 
the motion for new trial and presented in the 
petition of error. 
Lovick v. state, Okl. Cr., 646 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1982> · 
-6-
-
since appellant failed to take an exception to the 
11 cn<il, ctlld have it preserved for appeal in the record, this 
[:,sue is irn1,rot>erly before the Court at this time. Assuming, 
that this particular issue had been properly 
prPserved frn appeal, it is without merit since the trial court 
d1d nol abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to 
sever the counts. 
This Court has established that "[al denial will be 
reversed by this Court only if a defendant's right to a fair 
trial has been impaired." State v. Collins, Utah, 612 P.2d 775 
11980). Furthermore, the decision to grant or deny these 
severance/joinder motions "[rlests within the sound discretion of 
lhe trial Judge, and this Court will not interfere with that 
discretion unless it is shown to have been clearly abused." 
Slate y. Peterson, Utah, P.2d No. 18298 (filed 
AF i 1 13 , 19 8 4) • 
It is the trial court judge who is to "[jludge whether 
in a given case the prejudice resulting from joinder is too great 
to be Justified by the broader interests of avoiding duplicative 
trials." United States y. Jamer, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108 (4th Cir. 
: 9 i7 i • lt lt can be found that the trial court balanced the 
tactnr with the judicial economy factor when making 
· ,i,,11 Lo deny appellant's motion, then there is no abuse 
Ji 
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In the instant case, appellant merely speculates that 
the jury inferred a criminal disposition in appellant, since 
his charges were not severed. There is simply no proof that ttiE 
jury was prejudiced against appellant because of the joinder. 
Moreover, judicial economy was served by joinder of the charges 
in order to avoid needlessly duplicative trials, since 
appellant's possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge 
arose out of the same factual situation as the burglary and theft 
charges. 
Fu rthe rmor e, in the instant case, the elements relatina 
to each crime were sufficiently distinct so as to minimize the 
risk that the jury might be confused by cumulating the 
of the respective charges. There is absolutely no indication 
that the jury was unable to separate what evidence related to the 
respective charges nor is there any evidentiary basis for 
appellant's claim that he was convicted solely by reason of "his 
criminal disposition." v. United States, 331 F.2d 
85, 91 119641. In light of the fact that there were legitimate 
reasons supporting Judge Leary's decision denying appellant's 
pre-trial severance motion, there was no abuse of discretion. 
The cases appellant cites to support his position can 
be easily distinguished. All of the cases, namely, State v. 
Gotfrey, Utah, 598 P.2d 1325 119791, State y, McCumbe...t:, Utah, 
622 P.2d 353 119801, and Drew y. United States, 331 F.2d 85 
119641 concern multiple criminal charges that arise out of 
-8-
-•!"J'-filJ;: transactions. The charges were brought together in 
11101 merely because the defendant was the same person in all 
ri1ffPrent transactions. The courts found reversible 
•r(Gr in each ot these cases since the charges were not from a 
binyle criminal transaction and did not share a common scheme or 
design. Mccumber at 356, 93, Gotfrey at 1328. 
1n the instant case, however, all of the charges arose from one 
criminal transaction. Moreover, Gotfrey and Mccumber dealt 
with sexual offenses which are inherently prejudicial to a 
defendant. 
The one case appellant cites which is factually similar 
to his case is State y. Studham, Utah, 655 P.2d 669 <1982), 
which held that the denial of a motion to sever a possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person charge from an aggravated assault 
charge did not amount to a denial of due process. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied appellant's severance motion. Indeed, in the instant case 
there are good reasons why judicial economy was promoted where 
the charges arose out of the same criminal transaction and the 
crimes were simple and distinct, which minimized any potential 
conf11s1on by the jury. Finally, there was no proof that the jury 
Lour,<J apµcl larit guilty of the charges brought against him because 
'' '1 , ie•j a criminal disposition from his possession of a 
f \I Pc-)_ ,-11 ' 10str1cted person charge. 
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POINT II 
THE JURY WAS NEVER EXPOSED TO PREJUDICIAL 
OR INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends that when Stacy Williams, his 
accomplice, testified as to the location of the stolen goods 
following the burglary, Williams's response was a direct 
reference to appellant's prior burglaries. Appellant further 
argues that Williams's remarks with respect to his having taken 
the stolen items to "their fence" violated the court's order 
the State was obliged to notify both the trial judge and opposir.9 
counsel before presenting evidence of appellant's prior crimes. 
However, it is clear following a review of the transcript that 
the prosecutor was not questioning Williams regarding appellant's 
prior crimes; the prosecutor was merely attempting to determine 
where appellant had taken the stolen goods following this 
particular burglary. Therefore, the prosecutor did not violate 
the trial judge's order requiring prior notification before 
admitting evidence under then applicable Rule 55, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (Supp. 1978). 
The dialogue between the prosecutor and Williams is as 
follows:l 
lAppellant, in his brief, mischaracterized the nature of . 
Williams's testimony by omitting defense counsel's objections 
-10- -
U- you have a conversation about the two 
f irearnis and the television and the microwave 
0\1en-1 
4 Yeah. 
0 Who was participating in that 
conversation? 
A. Me and Gary. !appellant] 
Q. Who said what in that conversation? 
A. Gary told me, "Well, I got to be going 
back to the halfway house so I might as well 
take that stuff down and store it where we 
were storing it at." 
Q. Did you have a regular place to store 
things? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Where was that? 
A. My brother's. 
Q. What's his name? 
A. Timmy Shunk. 
MS. CARTER: I have an objection. May 
we approach the bench? 
(Off-the-record discussion held at the 
bench). 
Q. <By Mr. Housley) In this conversation 
that you had at Gary's house, did he tell you 
what to do after you got it down to the place 
to store it? 
A. Yes. 
0. What did he tell you? 
P HP told me to call our fence--his name is 
l" see what he wanted to buy. 
-11-
Q, Amos? 
A. Yeah. 
MS. CARTER: Your Honor, may we approach 
the bench again, just briefly? 
THE COURT: You are going to wear that 
rug out. 
(Off-the-record discussion held at the 
bench) 
Q, (By Mr. Housely) Do you know Amos' s 
name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is it? 
A. Amos Armijo, 
Q. After you had that conversation with Mr. 
Saunders, what did you do? 
A. I did what he told me. 
Q. Tell us what you did. 
A. I took the stuff down to my brother's. 
(T. 52, 53). 
Williams's testimony was obviously elicited for the 
purpose of establishing the course of events the night of the 
burglary, and more specifically in this portion, the purpose was 
to establish where the stolen goods had been taken. FurthermorE, 
even if Williams' s "our fence" and "regular place" comment could 
be interpreted as referring to appellant's prior wrongs, this 
evidence was not so prejudicial to constitute reversible error 
This Court has previously held that evidence relevant to explal' 
the circumstances of a crime is admissible even though it might 
-12-
cd 
""' lu connect the defendant with a prior wrong. state y • 
• 1,ic.1.;;;, ulah, 584 P.2d 880 <1978). State y. 
µ, , L' U t a 11 :! d 2 5 7 , 4 51 P. 2 d 7 7 2 (19 6 9 l • 
Mi.Ji e svecifically, in Alger y. State, Okla. Cr., 603 
p 2d 1154 (1980), the court addressed the effect to be given a 
vclur>tary, tangential remark by a witness. The defendant in 
on trial for taking indecent liberties with a minor. 
The victim's mother was called as a witness. During her 
testim0ny, in response to a question, the witness made a general 
reference to "it having happened before" with the defendant. 
Defense counsel argued that the statement was prejudicial. The 
court said: 
There is only an implication of another crime 
which is obvious only to defense counsel. 
To extend the protection of the rule to every 
possible implication which might be conceived 
by defense counsel is to extend the rule to 
far. 1156, quoting Burks y, 
Okla. Cr., 568 p.2d 322 <1977). 
W1lliams's statement parallels the type of statement at issue 
ir. A.l.g_u; a somewhat tangential remark made in response to a 
yuestion. Appellant was given adequate opportunity to rebut 
WilJiams's testimony and impeach Williams's credibility. The 
Jury weighed the conflicting testimony and rendered its 
ve,d1ct. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the jury 
L•as,,, •Ls verd1rt on William's statements that he was to take 
·J'"'ds to his brother's home and then call Amos, 
I·-"cc." Fu1tl1ermuie, Williams's statements are not 
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sufficiently prejudicial under the then applicable 
Rules 4 and 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, to warrant a mistriai. 
Rule 4 provides, in pertinent part: 
A verdict shall not be set aside, nor shall 
the judgment or decision based thereon, by 
reason of the erroneous admission of evidence 
unless ••• the court which passes upon the 
effect of the error or errors is of the 
opinion that the admitted evidence should 
have been excluded on the grounds stated £nQ 
probably had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict or finding. 
(emphasis added). 
Therefore, the defendant must make some showing that the verdict 
was directly and substantialy influenced by the challenged 
testimony, "Under Rule 4, •• .an erroneous admission of 
evidence is treated as harmless error absent a showing that it 
had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." 
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (1982). 
In State v. Creviston, Utah, 646 P.2d 750 (1982), 
the defendant was on trial for the sale of a controlled 
substance. In response to the prosecutor's question concerning 
the price of the cocaine, a police officer testified that the 
price was lower than usual because the defendant owed money to 
the State Narcotic and Provo Police Departments. The defendant 
objected to the remark as prejudicial and stated it would cause 
the jury to perceive him as a regular drug dealer and hardened 
criminal. This Court held, however, that the police officer's 
remark was not the type of statement which would be unduly 
-14-
,,e 1,i11'' ,,)]to the defendant. y, Dodge, 12 
1 ,)1, 365 P.2d 798 (1961), 
n 1ury verdict should not be overturned in spite of 
Ettui i£ 11_ can be fairly concluded that the error had no 
prPJud1cial effect on the complaining party. The verdict should 
_,,,J 1 be overturned when the error is so substantial or 
preiudicial that in its absence there would likely have been a 
different result. State y, Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326 (1980). 
Rule 45 makes clear that the admission of evidence is 
discretionary with the trial court. The judge may choose to 
exclude evidence if he finds the risk that its admission will 
create substantial danger prejudice." 
!emphasis added), Although a judge may exclude evidence, he 
shuuld do so only after concluding that an injustice will result 
by its admission. This Court: 
. . • respects [the trial judge's l 
prerogative in that regard and will not 
interfere with his ruling unless it clearly 
appears that he so abused his discretion that 
there is a likelihood that an injustice 
resulted. 
ilill Utah, 599 P.2d 518, 520 (1979), 
'I'his position is reiterated by the Court in State y. 
iiCl&LMil, 1lL1h, 652 P.2d 942 (1982) in which the Court stated 
'
1 rLc- iss,1•c was not whether the evidence created prejudice, 
t, '\·1:. 11 ,-, eated prejudice. Furthermore, it is the 
' ' - 1i ,, f l hE trial court to determine the prejudicial ef feet 
: i.: ocLL1 ·-sion. 
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At the conclusion of Williams's testimony, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial and was given the opportunity to 
argue the prejudicial effect of Williams's testimony to Judge 
Sawaya CT. 96). The motion was denied leading to the inference 
that the trial court weighed Williams's alleged prejudicial 
statement in the testimony and found it insufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. 
Appellant cites two cases which held that the evidence 
admitted to establish prior crimes was prejudicial and therefore 
inadmissible. However, State y. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 
P.2d 412 (1961) and State y. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 
407 (1963) can be distinguished from this case since they addrrn 
the rare situation when the evidence of prior crimes referred tc 
criminal charges that had been dismissed or had not yet been 
tried. In this situation where Williams was merely explaining 
what had been done with the stolen goods, there was no reference 
to appellant's tried or untried prior crimes. 
Appellant also argues that the presence of an unrelateo 
firearm on the evidence table prejudiced the jury against him. 
However, there is no proof that the jury even saw the firearm. 
Judge Sawaya said when denying appellant's motion for a mistrial. 
(T. 97). 
The gun, of course, was inadvertent. 
I don't put much store in the fact that it 
happened because I am not even sure the jury 
saw it. It was just like on the table. 
There is no way they can connect it up with 
the evidence in this case. The only evidence 
presented to them was the one of relevance. 
-16- ... 
111• , 11E:tther the unrelated firearm nor Williams's 
be reyarded as so severely prejudicial to the 
.,,t t1. rnanrlale reversible error. 
POINT III 
APPBLLANT'S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
WAS NOT DENIED WHEN THREE JURORS SAW 
APPELLANT IN HIS PRISON CLOTHES AND 
SHACKLES OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM. 
In the morning, before the second day of trial began, 
appellant was escorted from the elevators in the Third Judicial 
District Court Building to a dressing room where he was to change 
from his prison garb to his street clothing for trial CR. 508-
'•lll. When he stepped off the elevator, three jurors, who were 
standing, coincidentally, near the elevator waiting for the trial 
to begin, saw appellant for a few seconds in his prison attire 
und shackles (R. 508-511). As a result, later that same morning 
i 11 the Judge's chambers, appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial 
!T. 133l. Counsel argued that the jurors's momentary observation 
1 i appellant in his prison attire outside the courtroom violated 
'Ppellant's presumption of innocence. Judge Sawaya denied this 
'c·tt'Jli IT 1331. A month after the trial, appellant's counsel 
Ji· •· ,,., 'i·.·n tu arrest judgment and asked the court to 
1·.· • U1e issue (R. 504). The trial jduge said he could not 
"' 111r 01 re-arguing it" but did allow the witness, Ron 
1 
"''·"" • ·1 r Officer at the Utah State Prison, to 
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testify CR. 505, 506). Mr. Solomon testifed that he had escort,, 
appellant to the dressing room to change clothes, according to 
the routine, but when they stepped off the elevator en route tl 
the dressing room, three jurors standing near the elevator saw 
appellant for a few seconds CR. 510). Following this testimony, 
the motion to arrest judgment on this point was denied (R. 2621, 
Again, appellant argues that he was prejudiced after viewing 
appellant in his prison attire and shackles, and he is therefore 
entitled to a new trial. 
The cases which appellant cites in support of his 
position are inapposite. Appellant, in the instant case, was oot 
compelled to stand trial in his prison clothes. Estelle y. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), Chess y. Smith, Utah 617 P.2d 
341 (1980). Furthermore, appellant was not forced to stand trial 
wearing handcuffs, McKenzey v. State, 225 S.E.2d 512 (Georgia, 
1976), nor was appellant escorted into the courtroom while all of 
the jurors watched when his handcuffs were removed prior to 
trial, Moore y. State, 535 S.W.2d 357 (Texas Crim. Ap., 1976). 
Appellant never appeared in the courtroom, before the jury, in 
his prison garb during the course of the trial; he was merely 
seen by a few jurors for a few seconds while he was en route to 
the dressing room where he changed into street clothing. This 
momentary, inadvertent observation by a few jurors is not 
tantamount to an abridgement of fundamental rights, 
-18- ... 
1ke the situation where a defendant is tried in 
l"'' .1"<1,, L,L;.llo;:__v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) far less 
c" t";: iud1ce inheres in a situation where a juror's 
clPfe11dant in Jail uniform is fleeting and outside 
Ll1P ,- rr,,,,,,_ united States y. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 527 
11.9 rnth C1'. J 977). Likewise, state courts have been 
:iioiri:linP•I to grant new trials when faced with similar issues. 
C.lcredo's Supreme Court in People y. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841, 846 
1.colu., 1983) held that "The mere fact of exposure of a hand-
defendant is not necessarily sufficient to warrant the 
g!antins of a mistrial." In an earlier case, Colorado's Supreme 
Cr·urt r11led that a defendant's exposure before two jurors in the 
ltallway, when the defendant was wearing handcuffs, did not 
c0nstitute reversible error. People y, McLean, 473 P.2d 715, 
'19 (Colo., 1970). And New Mexico's Court of Appeals 
606 P.2d 1111 (N.M. App., 1980) held that when the 
defendant was observed in handcuffs by three jurors outside the 
CcJrtroom during the noon recess, he was not prejudiced, and 
tliE:refore the trial court had not erred when it denied the 
df'fendant 's motion for mistrial. 
In order to constitute reversible error, the exposure 
:,£ u-.e defendant must be both unnecessary and prejudicial. 
'.:f-''.11..-if.; _Y..__._lL,._1-..LQnf at 846. Moreover, the defendants bear the 
1 ot It'"'" i- ively demonstrating prejudice. United States 
F.2d 535, 549 (5th Cir. 1977), United States 
"" ,:,q f".2d 616, 617 (8th Cir. 1981). 
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For valid security purposes, it was necessary to 
transport appellant from the prison to the court in his prisc. 1, 
clothes and shackles. It is neither unreasonable nor 
unnecessary for a defendant to be handcuffed when being moved 
to and from the courtroom. McLean y. People, 473 P.2d 715, 
719 (Colo. 1970). 
Moreover, besides his bald assertion, appellant fails 
to affirmativley demonstrate that he was prejudiced. Appellant 
merely speculates that his presumption of innocence was injured 
and that he was forced to stand trial before a partial jury. 
He offers no evidence whatsoever in support of his assertions. 
Furthermore, the State was taking every precaution to safeguard 
appellant's presumption of innocence by providing him with an 
opportunity to remove his prison garb. There is no indication 
that while en route to the dressing room appellant was 
purposefully placed before the three jurors in his prison clothes 
and shackles, nor was appellant forced to stand trial in his 
prison clothes. Nothing on the record indicates that 
was unduly injured by the momentary observation by the jurors. 
Since it cannot be shown that it was unnecessary to transport 
appellant in his prison garb, and the appellant failed to make a 
showing of any prejudice, the trial court's decision to deny 
appellant's motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of discrttic·' 
and should therefore be affirmed. 
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POINT IV 
TllE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY COMMENTED ON THE 
EV IDE!KE DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
A.f'f't:llant next contends that during closing argument 
the prosiccutor inappropriately commented on appellant's failure 
tu testify and thereby deprived appellant of both his right to an 
impartial jury verdict and his right against self-incrimination. 
However, it is clear following a review of the prosecution's 
argument that the prosecutor was only rebutting defense 
(Ounsel's comments that appellant was not guilty by summarizing 
the evidence presented during the trial which established 
appellant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor 
stated· 
The first thing she said [defense 
counsel] was that the defendant is not 
guilty, the defendant did not commit the 
burglary, the defendant did not commit this 
theft, the defendant did not possess these 
firearms. Now, there's no proof of that, 
absolutely no proof of that. The only proof 
that we have here in court and the court has 
instructed you to base your decision on the 
evidence -- the only proof, the only evidence 
is that he did do it. That's the testimony 
of Stacy Williams. 
In order for you to say that defendant 
is not guilty you would have to say that 
Stacy Williams is lying. You would have to 
say that Stacy Williams is not telling the 
1· rnth about his participation, about the 
rletendant's participation in this case. Now, 
thaL's not proof--that's not proof that he 
didn't do it. The most that you could say 
tr., a ronclusion is that Stacy Williams is 
',,1 ent1onally lying to you under oath. The 
only conclusion you could reach, if you reach 
that conclusion, is that the conclusion may 
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create a reasonable doubt; so I urge you to 
look at evidence realistically. Look at 
this evidence for what it is, and that is, it 
is not evidence that the defendant is not 
guilty. 
(T. 149, lSO). 
Counsel, in a criminal case, is given considerable 
freedom to express views on the evidence that has been presented 
at trial during closing argument. State v. Wells, Utah, 603 
P.2d 810, 819 (1979). There can only be a reversal of a convic-
ti on if the comments made were so prejudicial or substantial that 
there is a reasonable likelihood there would have been a 
different result if the comments had not been made. State y. 
Sorrels, Utah, 642 P.2d 373 Cl982J. In the instant cases, the 
prosecutor was acting well within the boundaries established for 
closing argument and his comments were not prejudicial toward the 
appellant; there would not have been a different result. 
In State v. Kazda, Utah, S40 P.2d 949 (1979), this 
Court explained that it is the duty of counsel to analyze all 
aspects of the evidence and that "[tJhe prosecutor, and the 
public whose interest he represents, should and does have a right 
to argue the case upon the basis of the total picture shown 
the evidence or the lack thereof." at 9Sl. And, "[t]ht 
prosecution has both the duty and prerogative to analyze what thE 
evidence does or does not show, as bearing on the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant." state v. White, Utah, S77 P.2d 
SS2, SSS Cl97 8) • The prosecutor, in the instant case, was me rel' 
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at 
1e 
,/':'Li,cing l1is >''E'lugative to comment on the evidence that had 
,.,,, r 1, coonrPd; he made no direct or indirect reference to the 
L tho' <i['l>ellant had not taken the stand.2 
ln State y, Eaton, Utah, S69 P.2d 1114 (1977), the 
in his closing argument said that only "[tlhe defendnt 
really knows what took place in the house" and asked "what does 
the defendant tell us?" Since those statements were direct 
references to the defendant's failure to testify, this Court 
reyarded the remarks as prejudicial and granted a reversal. 
But, in this case, the prosecutor did not make any direct or 
indirect statements commenting on appellant's failure to testify; 
the prosecutor properly used his closing argument time to present 
his theories of the evidence to the jury. 
Moreover, any error that could be inferred from the 
comments were cured by a cautionary instruction 
given by the trial judge that told the jury not to assume any 
presumption of guilt if the defendant did not testify in his own 
behalf (R. 214, Instruction No. 9). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecutor improperly 
placed the burden of proof on defense counsel. Appellant cites 
y, Segna, SSS F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977) where the 
Pn'sec111·01 told the Jury that they could presume the defendant 
0
"f1E ;,, c. ,,,,,rder case when it had been established by the defense 
11 "'' i11ap1,ru['riately cites two cases, Doyle v. Ohio, 
U.'. hlU <JG761 and state y, Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 
add1ess "post arrest silence" but not the issue 
,, r.:'!!11re to testify". 
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that the defendant was insane and the burden was on the state tc' 
prove that the defendant was sane. In the prosecutor 
made direct misstatements of the law that resulted in an 
inappropriate shifting of the burden of proof. However, in thi: 
case, appellant asserts that the prosecutor's statements 
the burden of proof without showing when or where the burden 
shifted. Moreover, a reading of the prosecutor's statements 
reveals that he never asked appellant's counsel to prove 
appellant innocent. The prosecutor just asked the jury to 
consider the evidence that had been given, decide whether 
Williams was telling the truth and if they believed Williams's 
testimony to find appellant guilty. The prosecutor did not 
misstate the law, nor did he shift the burden of proof to 
appellant. 
The prosecutor stayed well within the bounds 
appropriate for closing argument. He argued the case upon Ue 
basis of the total picture shown by the evidence; he did not 
comment on appellant's failure to testify. Appellant was not 
injured by the prosecutor's appropriate comments on the evidence. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S STATUS AS A HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Appellant contends that his conviction under Utah's 
habitual criminal statute should be reversed since two of the 
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e. 
: 1 ''°' c<>1iv1ctJ CJllS which the State submitted in support of the 
horse - wf'tt invalid guilty pleas. Appellant also claims that 
,1,, _c"L' ,,, •· imposed by the trial judge following his conviction 
,,,,],, the habitual criminal statute of five years to life 
iwprisonn•• nt is disproportionate since his prior convictions 
iall fu1 bu1glary) should be considered as "property offenses" 
and are therefore less serious than offenses involving violence. 
However, the two guilty pleas which the prosecutor offered were 
not constitutionally invalid, and appellant's sentence was not 
disproportionate to the crimes he had committed. Moreover, 
appellant's main contention that the sentence was dispropor-
tionate to his prior crimes since he considered his previous 
"burglary" crimes to be non-violent is without merit since 
burglary is considered to be, in this state, at least, a violent 
crime. 
A. SENTENCING APPELLANT UNDER UTAH'S HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL STATUTE WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellant contends that Utah's habitual criminal 
0 tat 11te is unconstitutional as applied to him since it makes no 
distinction between property offenses and violent crimes. 
Ttie tual n iminal statute, Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 
19-:g1 reads: 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
__ c,.ler1ced, and committed for felony offenses 
.1 one of which offenses having been at 
a felony of the second degree or a 
'rime which, if committed within this state 
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would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
This Court recently reviewed § 76-8-1001 in State y. 
Montague, Utah, 671 P.2d 187 (1983) and determined that "[tlhe 
language of the statute was clear and unambiguous" and that its 
purpose is to "Cmlake persistent offenders subject to greater 
sanctions." Montague at 190. The Court did not distinguish 
between persistent "violent" offenders and persistent "non-
violent" offenders, rather it grouped all persistent offenders ir. 
the same category. Moreover, the Court in Montague affirmed 
the defendant's conviction as an habitual criminal after 
considering his prior burglary convictions. 
Furthermore, appellant's argument that Utah's habitual 
criminal statute as applied to him is cruel and unusual punish1-
rnent because his burglary convictions were not "crimes of 
violence" is without merit since burglary is considered a violent 
crime. Appellant conveniently classifies all of his prior 
burglary convictions in the "non-violent" crime category. 
However, the Utah Legislature has included burglary in the 
•violent" crime category along with assault, rape and murder. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-501(5) (Supp. 1978) reads: 
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15) "Crime of violence" means murder, 
'vu11intary manslaughter, rape, mayhem, 
robbery, burglary, house-
l» ea king, extortion, or blackmail accompanied 
Ly threats of violence, assault with a 
rla11gerous weapon, assault with intent to 
t any offense punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year, arson punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, or an 
attempt to commit any of the foregoing 
offenses. 
1fn1ur1as1s added). £1.SQ 18 U.S.C.A. § 4251. 
Finally, despite appellant's contention to the 
contrary, when using the first prong of the proportionality 
review test established in Solem y. Helm, __ U.S. __ , 103 
S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d No.2 637 (1983), appellant's sentence is 
not su disproportionate to the crimes he has committed to 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
The Supreme Court in Solem y. Helm held that South 
Dctkota's recidivist statute, which imposed a life sentence 
wlthout possibility of parole, was significantly disproportionate 
t_,, thee felony which triggered employment of the recidivist 
Etcotute, that of uttering a "no-account" check for $100.00. In 
its analysis, the Court narrowly limited the extent of their 
ruling and reiterated the statement made in Rummell y, Estelle, 
J'i u S n ', 272 (1980) that • lolutside the context of capital 
•, ,,;,,hn1Ecnt, ,S<JCcessful challenges to the proportionality of 
'' se11tences will be exceedingly rare.• Solem y. Helm, 
Jl1<= litlID Court then carefully limited its holding to 
; "l U1.;t Lhe felony that triggered the defendant's life 
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sentence without possibility of parole was issuing a no-account 
$100.00 check • .H.e...lm, at 653, n.21. The Court narrowly 
tailored the opinion of .H.e...lm to leave intact the Court's 
previous decision in Rummell y. Estelle where it held that 
sentencing a persistent "non-violent" offender under Texas's 
recidivist statute was not unconstitutional. .H.e...lm could be 
distinguished from Rummell since defendant Rummel 1 was eligible 
for parole twelve years after his initial confinement while 
was to be imprisoned for life with no possibility of parole. 
The case at hand is substantially different from litlJn 
since the felonies that triggered the imposition of Utah's 
habitual criminal statute were burglary, theft, and 
a firearm by a restricted person, all serious offenses if 
contrasted with uttering a no-account check for $100.00. 
Moreover, Utah's habitual criminal statute does not prohibit the 
possibility of parole. For these reasons, appellant's 
indeterminate sentence of five years to life imprisonment, with a 
possiblity of parole, is not so significantly disproportionate tc 
the crimes appellant has committed to be prohibited by the 
Amendment. 
B. APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE 
BASED, ON VALID GUILTY PLEAS. 
Appellant argues that two of his three prior 
convictions were the result of invalid guilty pleas, and 
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st' 
, 1 , e. Ltie:cce convictions could not be used in charging him as 
,,.,, , , ,.,, L er iminal. However, all of the convictions were 
, ,, •ltunally valid and able to support appellant's conviction 
uf hal'! L'.Jal er iminal status. 
TJ11s Court has ruled that if the Custodian of the 
Records at the Utah State Prison positively identifies petitioner 
.ond produces copies of commitments on file at the prison, .s..t..a.t..e. 
v. Washington, 24 Utah 2d 111, 476 P.2d 1019 !1970) or if the 
State produced a certified copy of the commitments, State y, 
JkilX, n Utah 2d 79, 368 P.2d 595 <1962), such proof is 
sufficient to support an habitual criminal conviction. 
In this case, the State produced certified copies of 
the Judgments and commitments on file at the district court 
clerk's office. (..5..e..e. Appendix A, B, Cl. The State also 
produced the identical judgment and commitment orders kept on 
fiJ e at the Utah State Prison. Furthermore, Beverly Tisher, 
Recorrls Officer at the Utah State Prison, testified to the 
authenticity of the copies and identified appellant as Gary Vance 
Saunders listed in the prior convictions (T. 188-190). The 
evidence presented to establish appellant's status as an habitual 
'm•nal was sufficient. 
Nevertheless, appellant contends that his 1976 
""' 1t- invalid since there is a blank space where his 
''•'"':.: should be in the affidavit, wherein he knowingly 
plead guilty. However, stapled to the affidavit 
by appellant's attorney certifying that he had 
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discussed the implications of the affidavit with appellant anu 
believed that appellant understood what he was doing. Moreover 
the judgment and commitment indicate that appellant was 
represented by an attorney. Appellant's argument that no 
attorney was listed is rendered frivolous after a more thorough 
examination of the records submitted c..s..e..e_ Appendix Cl. 
Appellant's 1976 burglary conviction, when combined 
with the 1978 burglary conviction not contested on appeal, 
constitute the two convictions necessary to support an habitual 
criminal charge under § 76-8-1001. However, even the 1964 
conviction which appellant argues is invalid is found to be 
valid following a review of the pertinent documents. 
Appellant asserts that his 1964 guilty plea was not 
voluntarily entered since (1) he was promised probation if he 
would plead guilty, yet he was committed to the Utah State 
Prison, and (2) he could not recall being advised of the 
consequences of his guilty plea in 1964, which was later requireci 
by Boykin y. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288 (1969); Burgett y. Texas, 
389 U.S. 109 (1967) and McCarthy y. United States, 394 U.S. 459 
(1969). 
Fir st, a promise of probation by the Di strict Attorney 
and appellant's attorney has no affect on the validity of a 
guilty plea. When sentencing criminals, the trial judge is not 
bound by any promises made to the defendants by the attorneys. 
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Utah, 585 P.2d 450, 453 <1978), State y. 
i_ilah, 552 P.2d 129, 130 <1976). 
Next, appellant contends that his 1964 conviction did 
not meet the standards established in Burgett, and 
tKCarthy. Appellant's assertions rests upon his own 
recollection of what took place when he plead guilty. While the 
record does not indicate whether the plea was voluntarily 
enteted, the record does indicate that appellant was represented 
ny counsel. And in habitual criminal cases, the State does not 
have the burden of proving that a guilty plea was voluntarily 
if it can be shown that a defendant is represented by 
counsel at the time of entering the plea. State y, Malone, 
h'ash. App., 582 P.2d 883, 886 (1978). Moreover, appellant is 
contesting this conviction on his recollection alone and this 
Court has stated, "In the absence of record evidence to the 
contrary, we assume regularity in the proceedings below." 
illll:. y. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 Cl982l. Since the judgment 
and commitment indicate that appellant was represented by counsel 
wt.en entering his guilty plea, and appellant makes only bald 
assertions that his plea was not voluntarily entered, this Court 
assume regularity in the proceedings below and hold that in 
-•se r;f Llie 1964 conviction was based upon a valid guilty 
1 " i li the affirmation of the 196 4 conviction, there are 
· ·--- •c 1 ·-l Lum·ictions upon which appellant's habitual criminal 
1-=li · '::lE- can rest. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant failed to properly preserve the severance 
issue for review on appeal. Furthermore, the trial court did nGt 
abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to sever 
the possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge from 
the burglary and theft charges since the charges arose from the 
same criminal transaction, and the elements of the charges were 
simple and distinct, thereby reducing the risk of confusion by 
the jury. Moreover, the appellant failed to establish any 
prejudice against him. 
The jury was not exposed to prejudicial or inadmissible 
evidence. The testimony of appellant's accomplice was elicited 
to establish the events that took place the night of the crime. 
The prosecutor was not attempting to place evidence of 
appellant's previous crimes before the jury. Even if the 
statements inferred prior burglaries, they were not so 
prejudicial to constitute reversible error. Finally, the 
unrelated firearm was inadvertent, and there was no way the jucy 
could connect it with the case. 
Appellant's presumption of innocence was not denied 
when three jurors saw appellant in his prison attire. The triai 
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's 
motion for a mistrial. It was necessary for security purposes t 
transport appellant in his prison garb and shackles, and 
appellant failed to make an affirmative showing of prejudice. 
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The prosecutor properly commented on the evidence 
1 argument. He did not comment on appellant's 
, __ ", , at trial; he merely presented the State's 
r)f tht case based on the evidence presented. 
Finally, appellant's sentence for his habitual criminal 
slat us was not significantly disproportionate to his crimes. 
And, the prior convictions that supported appellant's habitual 
crirr1inal status were based on valid guilty pleas. 
Therefore, appellant's convictions should be affirmed 
s111ce there was no reversible error in the proceedings at trial. 
DATED this of August, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
J. STEPHEN MIKITA K 0 
Assistant Attonley=:1 
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APPENDIX A 
LOIJPT OF THE THI RO JUDICIAL 
7 51 !.H '71! 
j I) I, 
1.-.lf (Jr 11:r-; 
1-']jJ• '1 Ff \ 1567 A 
CASE NO. 31349 
BIJRGLARY & THEFT 
the t1rne fixed for passin9 of sentence upon the above 
jefenJart, the said anoearing in person and being 
tv Galen Ross as counsel, the State of Utah being 
The defendant is no11 
'rer:1 ;..: he tias 1el}al cause to sho11 ... 1hy sentence should not be 
defendant answerinc he has none. Judgement 
:erterce f'"'Jr1ounced as follows: 
is the Judgefi1ent and sentence of 
Court you Gary V. Saunders 
confined and imorisoned ln the Utah 
for the Indeterminate 
.,.errr of l-15 years as ;:>rovided by law 
for crime cf Ourglary Degree 
Fe 1 cry) . " 
1• 1s the Judgement sentence of 
; 1 11 s Ccu:t triat yoc.: Gary V. Saunders 
and the Utah 
tate Fr1sGn for the 
: e r ..,, o' l - l 5 y ea rs a s prov i de d by l a 1·1 
fer the crirne of Theft (2nd 
F '. l ', '1 y) . I 
that the sentences are to run concurrently. 
'' e +:rt "'1-1 it h. 
i-'t:1 .'1r,_e. oi Salt Leke County, Utah are hereby 
·tie said Garv v. Saunders and without 
then and there to be confined in 
\·,·rr1T.1 heretofore 
1Jne 29. 1978 
l. 
APPENDIX B 
"' rnc ODTHICT COU/11 Of THE 1HlllD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN Ah1J FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
- -ooOoo- --- -
-ooOoo-
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 18748 
VS 
BURG LA RY IN SECOND DEGREE 
GARY VANCE 
February lB, 1964. 
This be11'lg t .. e time beretofore set for tbe passiag of sentence 
JPr10 tt'le tri1i tbio 1amed Defendant, the Defendant appe1ri•g in person 
aod being represented by Galen Boss as CO\lDSel; Assistant District 
P.itorney, Peter F. Leary appearing in behalf of the State of Utab. 
the Defeodant is asked if he has any legal cause to show 
,,,hy sentence should not be passed upo1 bim, the Defendant answering 
Lh<it he h;;is none, the follo•ing judgment and sentence is pronounced 
11s follows, to-wit: 
.. The Judgment aad Sentence of this Court is 
tbat you, Gary Vance Saunders, be confined 
in tbe Utah State Prison for the iadeten:iin1te 
term of from one (1) to t"eaty (20) years as 
provided by 11" for tbe crime of Burglary In 
The SecoDd Degree, as. charged in the Information". 
CO!llll1l!E1''1 TO ISSUE FORTllWITH. 
And, you George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt l.ake County, Ut1h 
;;,-"' hereby commeaded to tall:e the nid Gary Vance Sauader1, 11d deliver 
\1 •m 1'! ti.out delay to the Utah State Prilo1 tben aad there to be confined 
'.'ll 'l1rdance wi \h the seateace aid comit•ent heretofore iaposed. 
llERRILL C. FAUX 
J U D G E 
APPENDIX C 
Ill[ 01\iRlrT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
\Al T LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
11 o G M E N T and 
- [,, t ' I 
1a1r1t1 tf 
, ,: E Sf, I iri l [ P, rJ 
Defendant 
CASE NO. 30202 
CITY tlO. 66617 
upon the above 
r-i"'e'J defendant, the said defendant apoearing in person and being 
repcesented by Grad Rich as counsel, the State of Utah 
by Glenn Iwasaki as counsel. The defendant is now 
if he has any legal cause to show why sentence should not be 
:·assed nim, the defendant answering he has none. Judgement 
Jr 1 sentence 1 s pronounced as follows: 
'It is the jud9ement and sentence of 
this Court that you Gary Vance Saunders 
be confined imorisoned in the Utah 
State Prison for the Indeterminate Term 
,of 1-15 years as provided by la>i for the 
Of Bur9lary (2nd Degree Felony)." 
· e t.. r1 j o •1 t i s no 11 pl aced on probation under the s u o er vision of 
.,"' r-, 1t hotJt10n and Parole Oepartr.ient on the conditions as 
rC"'J tr:e rle11,'s minute entry. 
re nJ tne set for an order to show cause hearina. The 
11 .lcint 1n person and beinq represented by Gaylen Ross 
'( 
1
,.., ,e · of Utah bei nq represented by Spencer Aust·i n 
1•ow the defendant and admits the allegations set 
on file herein. Based on the defendant 1 s 
finds t'ie defendant has violated the terms and 
1 and the Court orders the probation 
'"1111' tr-1ent is to issue forthwith in accordance with 
''"'r"L''r 1"·re imposed on June 17, 1977. 
1 '.'r·Jered th<it the above sentence is to run concurrently 
.rr' pn:es the defendant is 
'. IN THE DISTRICT 
IN AND !'OR 
STATE OF IJTAB, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
I, 
Al.Bl IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Solt County, Uteh 
FEB 11 rm 
. . !th... 
OF IJTAH 
Criminal No. S3 ?' til /I ?-
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFBNDANT 
named defendant, under oath, hereby aclcnowledge that I have 
to the charge of entered a plea of guilty 
contained in the Information on file 
against me in the above-entitled court, a copy of which I have 
received, (or to the lesser offense of-------------
included in the charge contained in the Informa-
tion on file against me in the above-entitled court): that I 
understand the nature of that cha.rge and that it is a 
(degreer 
and that I am entering such plea voluntarily 
class) 
and of my a-'n free will after conferring with my attorney 
and with a knowledge and understand-
ing of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have a constitutional right under the Con-
stitution of Utah and of the United States to plead not guilty 
and to have a jury trial by persons upon the charge to 
which I have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by the court 
should I elect to waive a trial by jury. 
2. know that if I wish to have a trial in court upon 
the charge. have a right to be confronted by the witnesses 
aqd1nst me by having them testify in open court in my presence and 
before the court and jury with the right to have those witnesses 
examined by my attorney. I also know that I have a right to 
LAKE 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEX.EC Ar-.;0 F0R!'.:001N0 IS 
A TPUE "'NO FULt. COPY CF AN ORIGINAL OOCV· 
MENTON FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
HANO ANlSEAL OF f>,6.10 COURT 
AY OF 
7
_ 1...3:.2-
W. 
BY Dl!PU'T"f 
hdve w1triesst'!9 subpoenaed by the 9tate at its expense to testify 
1.1• ourt upon my behalf and that I could. if I elected to do so. 
,, .. ·gtify in court on my orwn behalf. and that if I chose not to do 
9u. the JI-HY can be told that this may not be held against me. 
f know that if I were to have a trial that the state 
prove each and every element of the crime charged to the 
sot ion of the court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt: that 
T '«CJJld have no obligation to offer any evidence myself: andt that 
any ·"'erd ict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not 
guilty must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
4. know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the 
united States that I have a right against self-incrimination or 
a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any 
crime and cannot be compelled to testify in court upon trial unless 
choose to do so. 
5. know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the court that I would 
have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme 
court of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal. that those costs 
would be paid by the state without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty 
J am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the five pre-
ceding paragraphs and that I am. in fact. fully incriminating 
myself by admitting am guilty of the crime that my plea of guilty 
is entered to. 
7. kncrw that under the laws of Utah that the sentence that 
may be imposed upon me upon my plea of guilty is imprison-
T·-0.r,1_ in 1_11e Utah State Prison for a term of _ __ _ years 
1-1. rh· . .:: Lou.nty -Jaj l for any term not exceedinq -------
..... r t cnt!il .any amount 11ot.: in excess of or 
,1 tf·?;t lhis is the_ same sentence that could be imposed 
aa 1 f I had stood upon a plea of 
]'Jl 1 t: y 
I THE CLEl'U< OF OISTillillCT 
OF SALT LAKE couNT'V, UTA.H, DO HEREBY 
CERTIFY THA.T THE A.NNEXEO ANO FOREQOINQ 16 
A TRUE AND FUL..L COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU· 
MENT QN FILE IN MY OFFICE AS 8UCH CLl!:fllK. 
HANO """1' SE.AL 01"' 6AID cog.:r.:::z-_ 
w. 
•v ., -a c.. 2t..- o:PVTV 
-B. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not, mean .. the court won't impose either a or 
sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made 
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead guilty 
or that it will be made lighter because Of my guilty plea. 
9, No one has threatened or coerced ae to make me plead 
'Jl• i 1 ty and am doing so of my a.m free will and after discussing 
1r my attorney. I know that any opinions he may have expresred 
to ioe are not binding on the court. 
10. No promises of any kind have been made to me to induce 
me to plead guilty. except that I have been told that if I do 
plead guilty to the charge mentioned above. other charges pending 
against me in this or other courts will be dismissed and that no 
other charges will be filed against me for other offenses, if 
any, that I am known to have also cormnitted and for which no 
charges have as yet been filed. 
11. am not now under the influence of either drugs or 
alcohol. 
12. I have read this affidavit, or I have had it read to 
me by my attorney. and I know and understand its contents. I am 
__Ji___ years of age, have attended school through the ;,ft;£ 
9 &adb • and I can read and understand the English 
language. I have discussed its contents with my lawyer and ask 
the court to accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth 
above in this affidavit because I did, in fact, on 
• 19 z6 
Dated this 
;\it'':>C"!'" ihed and sworn to before me in court this 
AT fEST 
WJT AUN$) Ell-'NS 
,_.. CLERK 
- Ditpul)Clerll. 
_j_J_ day 
-) 
,,.. __ . 
, ert1f-, I am the lawyer for 
the defendant named above and I know he has 
_ ·d dffid·'.l.''1t, or that I have read it to him, and I dis-
- 1Js:o,::i·1 i 1_ , , Ji him arul bel1eve he fully understands the meaning 
.r-er1ts ar,c'! i<> mentally and phy9i.cally competent. 
the besl -:-1f my and belief the statements, representa-
i:_inns and made by the defendant in the foregoing 
1rlavit are tn all respects accurate and true. 
Based upon the facts set forth 1n the foregoing affidavit 
and certification, the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty 
1s freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's 
plea of "guilty' be acceptea
1
z entered. ;/ 
Done in court this _L_ day of + 
E>TATt::: OF UT"H ( 
C.OUNTY Of $ALT LAKE I 
i/7 ?'. 
I, THE CL-ERK OF" THE OtSTRICT 
COURT O>' Lt>,KF COL•-..TY. UTAH, 00 HEREB'f 
CEflTW'f THAT TH<- Ar.NE.>:.ED ANO F"OREGOINQ 16 
A TPUE "'"-·') F"L"_L COPY 0"" AN ORIGINAL OOCU· 
ME:NT O°' F'LE. JN "H QFF"•CE AS SUCH CL-ERK 
H,t,ND SEAL. OF 6AIO COURT 
Th!S OF" ( 
S"f ....-::: ,/ - Oll!:PVTY 
